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The source of the leak could only be the result of two possibilities,
and CAAT did attempt, unsuccessfully, to trace the source, as
described by Mr Justice King
The nature of the problems lawyers will continue to face
respecting digital evidence is illustrated in the recent case of
Campaign Against Arms Trade v BAE Systems PLC [2007] EWHC
330 (QB). Mr Justice King granted Norwich Pharmacal relief to the
Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) against BAE Systems PLC
(BAE) in this instance. Ann Feltham sent an e-mail on the 29
December 2006 to the members of the CAAT steering committee
internal e-mail list (caatcommiteee@lists.riseup.net), a private list
not open to the members of the public and comprising only the 12
members of the steering committee and seven members of CAAT’s
staff. The e-mail contained privileged legal advice that CAAT
received from its solicitors. A copy of the e-mail was sent to BAE.
Solicitors for BAE returned a copy of the e-mail printed on paper
to CAAT’s solicitors. This was the first time that CAAT came to
know of the leak.
The e-mail returned to CAAT was incomplete, as described by Mr
Justice King, at 31:
‘It was a redacted version of that which had come into the
possession of the Respondent and/or its own solicitors. All the
routing information, the header address and so forth, which
would give details of the email accounts through which the
email had been received and sent before arriving at the
Respondent and its solicitors, had been removed. Such removal
must have been done either by the Respondent or by its
solicitors acting on its instructions.’
The source of the leak could only be the result of two possibilities,
and CAAT did attempt, unsuccessfully, to trace the source, as
described by Mr Justice King:
‘45. As Ann Feltham says, there are really only two broad
possibilities: either the source is one of the authorised
recipients of the email, i.e. a member of the Applicant’s steering
committee or staff, or the email was intercepted or retrieved by
other means by a person or persons unknown, be it by
improper access to the Applicant’s or a recipient’s computer
system, interception at riseup.net or at some point whilst the
email was sent over the internet. In her first witness statement
she explains how she made enquiries of each of the authorised
recipients who each denied forwarding the email on. Her
second witness statement was made in response to that part of
the Respondent’s skeleton argument in which it is said that the
Applicant has not done enough and that before seeking the
present order the Applicant should have (skeleton para.27.)
“examined the electronic data available to it on its own
computer systems and those of ‘riseup.net’ and further should
have asked any authorised recipients to provide it with access
to their personal electronic data for purpose of determining
whether their denials of involvement in the copying are
accurate”.
46. In this later statement Ms Feltham says she did check the
‘sent folders’ on the personal computers of the staff based in
the Applicant’s office, but explains that there was a major
practical and logistical problem as regards access to the
computers used by members of the steering committee. Unlike
the staff they are not employees of the Applicant but volunteers
who do not work in the office or use computer systems
belonging to the Applicant. Some are members of other
organisations who access emails from accounts and equipment
owned by their employers. Some are based outside London.
This all means that to have investigated further on the lines
suggested by the Respondent, the Applicant would have
needed access to computers to which the Applicant has no
right of access and in any event the Applicant would have
needed the “costly services of a computer expert to go on a
fishing expedition for emails which might or might not have
been sent which moreover would have been very time
consuming.’
The claim by BAE that CAAT ought to physically examine every
computer to trace the route of the e-mail is somewhat unrealistic,
as explained above, and also fails to grasp the fundamental issue,
that digital data knows no geographical, physical bounds.
Returning the e-mail without the source data is similar to
returning a letter received through the post in an envelope, yet
refusing to deliver up the envelope. That the routing and other
technical data is ‘similar’ to the data included on an envelope is
an understatement, because the routing and other metadata
available in relation to an e-mail is far more extensive than the
metadata contained on an envelope. In this instance, Mr Justice
King concluded that the order sought ought to be granted,
although not in the terms requested.
This application, and the decision by Mr Justice King, illustrates
the importance of the metadata associated with a digital object.
Documents in digital format include metadata as a matter of
course, and it seems unrealistic for the recipient to refuse to
deliver up the full document, including the associated metadata,
in such circumstances.
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Unless legal academics educate potential lawyers in digital
evidence, and judges and lawyers concern themselves with the need
to be educated in the topic, more rough justice can be expected
across the globe.
The introduction of paper caused some lawyers consternation in
Europe, mainly because lawyers did not know how to assess the
veracity of the contents recorded on the paper carrier. As a result,
elaborate rules were developed in some countries for the
authentication of documents recorded on paper so as to prevent
or counter attempts at fraud. At the time, the pace of change was
probably slow enough to ensure that lawyers, judges and those
that entered the profession were able to improve their knowledge
and understanding of the evidential requirements relating to the
introduction of paper relatively easily.
However, some centuries later, a similar change has already
taken place with respect to digital data, and, it seems, that a large
majority of lawyers, legal academics and judges have failed to
realize they are now living in a world dominated by digital
evidence, and that digital evidence is now the dominant form of
evidence. Although quantifiable figures are not available, it can be
asserted with some confidence that the majority of lawyers, legal
academics and judges do not know they do not know; a smaller
number know they do not know, and an even smaller elite know
about digital evidence, but they are realistic enough to know they
need to know more.
The law acts as a means to provide for social stability, yet if
lawyers and judges fail to grasp that they need to begin to
understand the attributes of evidence in digital format, individuals
that are caught up in events such as those illustrated in the case
of the State of Connecticut v Julie Amero (January 2007, Docket
number CR-04-93292, Superior Court New London Judicial District
at Norwich, GA 21) will find themselves subject to the collective
failure of the legal system: by the prosecution, defence and judge.
This failure to become familiar with evidence in digital form by the
participants in the legal system is further acerbated by the failure
of the majority of universities and law schools across the world to
incorporate any discussion of digital evidence into the curriculum.
This means that the majority of students are taking degrees and
participating in vocational training that ignores the new reality,
that virtually all evidence brought before a court within the next
three years will be from a digital source (see The Expanding
Digital Universe: A Forecast of Worldwide Information Growth
Through 2010 (IDC White Paper, March 2007). Yet the vast
majority of students, lawyers and judges do not know how to
assess such evidence, nor are they in a position to brief digital
evidence specialists effectively, or to ask the right questions of
such specialists during the legal proceedings.
This state of affairs will continue for some time, and it seems
probable that many people brought before a criminal court may
well face rough justice if the digital evidence is misunderstood by
the lawyers and judge alike. In addition, parties in civil
proceedings may also face serious obstacles if their lawyers and
the judge fail to understand the importance of digital evidence:
one European lawyer informed the editor this summer that they
witnessed a judge refuse to receive photographic evidence taken
on a mobile telephone of the damage caused to a motor car by
another driver because, the judge asserted, the evidence could
have been fabricated – there was not even a discussion as to the
burden of proof or the procedure relating to which party could call
into question the authenticity of the photographs – the judge
blankly refused the admission of the evidence.
At the other end of the continuum, United States Magistrate
Judge Paul W. Grimm in Lorraine v. Markel and American
Insurance Co 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 1805, 207 WL 1300739 (D. Md.
May 4, 2007) provided a useful academic paper on the
authentication of digital evidence, yet failed to indicate why he
decided to dismiss certain evidence because it was not
authenticated.
Unless legal academics educate potential lawyers in digital
evidence, and judges and lawyers concern themselves with the
need to be educated in the topic, more rough justice can be
expected across the globe. Not only rough justice. Lawyers in
some jurisdictions can expect to face actions for negligence:
this will then cause the professional indemnity insurers to take
notice, and lawyers will then rush to become more educated. 
In the meantime, it is only to be guessed how many lay clients 
will be at the receiving end of poor legal advice in respect of
digital evidence.
